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BONJOUR, KANT, AND THE A PRIORI
Kurt Mosser
In his 1985 The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Laurence BonJour pre-
sented a compelling and articulate defense of a coherence theory of knowl-
edge.1 Following what he called a “dialectical” strategy, he began by indicat-
ing the central issue at stake: the justification of empirical knowledge claims.
He then argued that no available foundationalist or coherentist account could
provide that justification, and that all such attempts either end in sheer dog-
matism, or succumb to skepticism. After a lengthy critical discussion, he
turned to developing a argument for his own view, combining a correspon-
dence theory of truth with a coherence theory of justification. He further
suggested that such a view, to be adequate, must include a commitment to
the a priori — indeed, the synthetic a priori — while recognizing that this
could not be described as a pure coherence theory. However, this suggestion
was relegated to an appendix, and put forward rather gingerly by claiming
only that skepticism about the synthetic a priori was “by no means as intel-
lectually mandatory as it is often thought to be” (SEK: 211).
In a subsequent series of papers, which form the basis of his recent In
Defense of Pure Reason, BonJour has pursued this aspect of his argument
much further.2 Again following a “dialectical” approach, he criticizes at length
both moderate (represented by Hume and Kant, among others) and radical
(chiefly Quine) empiricists, and then defends a view he calls “moderate
rationalism,” which includes as an essential component a commitment to the
a priori, thus offering a defense for the rational, albeit fallible, insight into
necessity that the other approaches cannot provide. The epistemic stakes are
quite high here, and BonJour concludes that any epistemological view that
fails to include the synthetic a priori cannot succeed, generating skepticism of
greater or lesser virulence, and risking “intellectual suicide” (5; 99), the loss of
—————
1 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. All further references to this text are hereafter
indicated by “SEK,” and given parenthetically.
2 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; all parenthetical citations, unless
otherwise noted, are to this text. The earlier papers are “Toward a Moderate Rational-
ism,” Philosophical Topics vol. 23 (1995), pp. 47-78; “Against Naturalized Epistemol-
ogy,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy vol. XIX (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1994), pp. 283-300; and “A Rationalist Manifesto,” Canadian Journal of Philoso-
phy supplementary vol. 18 (1992), pp. 53-88.
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“cognitive sanity” (128), “irrationality and intellectual chaos” (138), and “giving
up rational thought altogether” (152).
Any discussion of the synthetic a priori must include an examination of the
views of Kant, who was not only the first to claim that synthetic judgements
could be a priori, but took the questions of whether such judgements could
occur, and if so how, to be central to his revolutionary approach to meta-
physics in the Critique of Pure Reason. BonJour recognizes this need to take
Kant’s account into consideration, and devotes a section of the first chapter of
In Defense of Pure Reason to Kant’s views; furthermore, no philosopher is
mentioned in the text more than Kant, with the (possible) exception of Quine.
Unfortunately, BonJour so badly misunderstands Kant’s philosophical view
that his critique of it cannot be accepted. What makes this something more
than a relatively idle exercise in the history of philosophy is that his rejection
of Kant’s theoretical philosophy forces BonJour to abandon his most powerful
ally in defending the very views he puts forth. Elsewhere, I have argued that
1) BonJour and Kant largely agree on what an adequate epistemology must
look like in its outlines, namely, the combination of a correspondence theory
of truth, a coherence theory of justification, and a commitment to the synthetic
a priori; 2) BonJour’s dialectical strategy fails to persuade because of a lack
of positive arguments for his own position; and 3) for sound epistemological
reasons, BonJour should find the kind of argumentative strategies Kant
deploys considerably more attractive than he does.3 Here I want to focus on
the specifics of BonJour’s reading of Kant’s views — particularly those found
in the Critique of Pure Reason — in order both to document the inaccuracies
and ambiguities of that reading, and to provide further evidence for the claim
that, on the basis of a misguided interpretation of Kant’s text, BonJour fails to
embrace precisely the strategic option that would best support his own
argument where it is at its weakest.
BonJour’s interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy can be summa-
rized fairly briefly, although some of its details will be brought out below. In
general, he sees Kant’s view as representative of what is described as
“moderate empiricism,” a position that incorporates “empiricist skepticism”
about the a priori, and claims that “a priori justification concerns only ‘relations
of our ideas’ as opposed to ‘matters of fact’”(17).4 While most associate this
doctrine with Hume, BonJour argues that Kant is “in fact much closer to
Hume” than he is to rationalism, and that Kant’s views are closer to Hume’s
than either Locke’s or Berkeley’s; indeed, this skepticism about the a priori,
which has become so dominant in Anglo-American philosophy, largely de-
—————
3 “What Do Foundationalists Want? What Do Coherentists Need? Prospects for
BonJour’s Moderate Rationalism” (manuscript).
4 BonJour, as do many, uses “a priori” adjectivally, although it has been correctly
pointed out by R.P. Wolff and W.H. Werkmeister that Kant uses the term adverbially;
hence, we should more precisely speak of, e.g., synthetic judgements put forth or
employed a priori. See Werkmeister, W.H., Kant (LaSalle IL: Open Court, 1980), p. 67,
p. 215 n. 42, and the reference there to Wolff.
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rives from Hume and Kant (17). Furthermore, for Kant, “the mind so shapes
or structures experience as to make the synthetic a priori propositions in
question invariably come out true within the experiential realm (23; BonJour’s
emphasis). From this, and because Kant’s synthetic a priori claims do not
pertain to an sich reality, “it appears to be for him [Kant] self-evident that we
can have no a priori knowledge of independent reality except that which is
analytic and ultimately trivial” (25). The synthetic concepts and principles Kant
seeks to justify as a priori reduce to analytic trivialities, that “necessarily falsify
reality” (152 n.15; BonJour’s emphasis), and the Kantian view “concedes that
the skeptic is right, not only about induction but about knowledge of the real
world generally, and then proceeds to offer us a pale substitute for the knowl-
edge thus abandoned” (200 n. 18). In sum, “if Kant had ever faced clearly the
problem of the epistemological status of his own philosophical claims, he
might have retreated into a more traditional rationalism” (25); having not done
so, his project collapses into a uneasy mixture of dogmatism and phenome-
nalism, embracing rather than defeating skepticism, and thus utterly failing to
offer any defense for the rational insight into necessity the a priori must
provide.
Two general themes emerge from this critique, an objection to Kant’s
metaphysics, and a more explicitly epistemological concern with the a priori
and its role in the justification of knowledge claims. BonJour is on much safer
ground in putting forth the former, for the ontological claims that result from
the perspectival shift in Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” have generated the
greatest controversy of any of Kant’s doctrines, including reactions from
Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Peirce, and Rorty, among many others.
The basic complaint is made succinctly by Hegel:
Thoughts, according to Kant, although universal and necessary determinations, are
only our thoughts — separated by an impassable gulf from what the thing in-itself
is.5
On this view, Kant’s is committed to an ontology of two kinds of objects: as
they appear to human beings, and objects as they are “in themselves,” or
what BonJour refers to as “an sich reality.” The obvious problem that results
is determining the relationship between the two, a problem that becomes
insoluble on Kant’s insistence that human beings, in principle, can never
know the latter. Thus human beings are forever denied access to reality,
quickly leading to skepticism due to the impossibility of bridging the impass-
able gulf to which Hegel refers.
While this view (now generally referred to as the “two world” interpretation)
of Kant’s ontology has a long history, an alternate interpretation (the “two
aspect” view) has been put forth that yields several distinct advantages:
having better textual support, ascribing to Kant a considerably more defensi-
ble view, explaining more plausibly changes Kant makes in his revisions for
—————
5 Hegel, G.W.F. Encyclopedia (“Lesser”) Logic, § 41 z.2.
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the Critique of Pure Reason’s second edition, and, most important, not
attributing a doctrine to Kant that he spends much of his effort in the First
Critique rejecting. In brief, on the two-aspect reading, a given epistemic
subject has two ways of regarding objects, or two different descriptions under
which those objects can be taken; only one such description has any cogni-
tive relevance for a being who makes judgements relative to a sensible
manifold that is itself passively received within the subjectively contributed
forms of time and/or space (e.g., a human being). On this reading, any
references to the “thing in itself,” or the constituents of an sich reality, are
cognitively vacuous, and in any case parasitic upon the objects of possible
experience, the objects that satisfy those conditions necessary for the epis-
temic subject to have experience and make truth-evaluable judgements about
them. As Arthur Melnick has made the point,
the notion of a thing in itself is that concept of an object according to which being
an object or a thing would make sense in abstraction from any idea of a (type of
subject) and his intellectual organization of his experience.6
If, in contrast, we initially take “objects” or “the real” to refer in some sense to
objects as they “really” are, and then ask how our objects correspond to
them, we embrace transcendental illusion, simply making it seem as if we
were asking a sensible cognitive question. This is precisely what Kant is
getting at when he tells us that the “true correlate of sensibility, the thing in
itself, is not known, and cannot be known … and in experience no question is
ever asked of it” (A30=B45; my emphasis; cf. A494=B522).7
By adopting without discussion the two-world interpretation, BonJour is
able to show without much trouble that what one might call Kant’s epistemol-
ogy is inadequate, and thus is forced to yield to skepticism about knowledge
of the real world in general. Unfortunately, he does so by imposing a burden
on Kant’s account that it need not confront, and thus need not discharge; for,
—————
6 Melnick, A., Kant’s Analogies of Experience (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1973), p. 152; also see Bird, G., Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (New York: Humanities
Press, 1962); Prauss, G., Erscheinung bei Kant (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971); Meerbote,
R., “The Unknowability of Things in Themselves” in Beck, L.W. (ed.) Kant’s Theory of
Knowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974); Allison, H., Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Thompson, M., “Things In Themselves,” Pro-
ceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 57 (1983);
Buchdahl, G., “Realism and Realization in a Kantian Light” in Schaper, E. and
Vossenkuhl, W. (eds.), Reading Kant (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
7 This is not to deny that the thing-in-itself plays a crucial role in Kant’s practical
philosophy. All references to the Critique of Pure Reason are given parenthetically and
in the standard way, citing “A” and “B” pagination for the first and second editions,
respectively. In general, I follow Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1929),
although I have emended his translation on occasion. All other references to Kant’s
texts are by volume number to Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der




on the two-aspect interpretation, there simply is no question of explaining the
cognitive relationship between objects of possible experience and an sich
reality. Indeed, explaining that relationship is precisely the obligation Kant
argues that neither the empiricism of Locke (and Hume), nor the rationalism
of Descartes and Leibniz, can meet; in short, BonJour attributes a view to
Kant, and criticizes him for being unable to defend it — transcendental
realism — that Kant explicitly rejects. As Kant writes, it is the transcendental
realist
who afterwards plays the role of empirical idealist. After wrongly supposing that
objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by them-
selves, and independently of the senses, he finds that, judged from this point of
view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to establish their actuality
[Wirklichkeit] (A369).
BonJour argues, in spite of what Kant quite specifically denies, that he must
provide an account of how the epistemic subject has cognitive access to that
which has been stripped of the very conditions that would make it an object of
possible experience, or an element of a possible cognitive judgement. Kant’s
own view, in contrast, is that the epistemic subject contributes a set of univer-
sal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, and that any
account of empirical judgements must recognize and justify that contribution.
This in turn leads to the denial that we can have experience of the external
world without that subject employing some theoretical or conceptual appara-
tus: a view BonJour himself exploits in criticizing at length foundationalist
arguments that rely, surreptitiously or not, on “the given” (see SEK: Chapter
Four passim., esp. pp 77-78).8
While I think it is clear that accepting the two-world interpretation of Kant’s
ontology is, at best, problematic, it is only on that basis that BonJour can
draw the remarkable conclusions he does relative to Kant’s account of truth,
justification, the a priori, and cognition. BonJour seems to find Kant offering a
set of claims about our knowledge of objects restricted to appearances, and
thus unable to state anything about the real world of objects. On this basis,
the mind constructs its own phenomenal experience; consequently, all ob-
jects of that experience will conform to the rules the mind imposes for that
construction. From this, BonJour concludes that all synthetic a priori proposi-
tions are true, relative to this phenomenal experience (23), and thus are
ultimately analytic, including specific principles such as the causal maxim (25
n. 25). While he does not specifically address Kant’s own attempt to satisfy
the “observation requirement” (SEK 141-144), BonJour’s reading prevents
him from seeing that Kant’s empirical realism embraces a notion quite similar
to BonJour’s own, including a commitment to “extratheoretic input” couched in
—————
8 The point, of course, is most familiar from Wilfred Sellars’s classic “Empiricism and
the Philosophy of Mind,” the influence of which BonJour’s acknowledges (SEK 249 n.1)
and which is itself very much in debt to Sellars’s reading of Kant.
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terms of a spatio-temporal intuition [Anschauung].9 One is tempted to see
BonJour tending toward the interpretation Richard Rorty has offered, sug-
gesting that a specifically Kantian “realist” transcendental argument must be
such that
our “legitimating” transcendental knowledge of the necessary truth that content will
correspond to scheme, is made possible by the fact that our subjectivity (the
scheme) creates the content.10
Unfortunately, the interpretation given by Rorty (and BonJour) cannot be
supported either directly or indirectly by Kant’s text. Kant’s metaphysics may
well move in the direction of an anti-realism BonJour finds unattractive, as
can be seen in his brief critical remarks on Dummett (150-151). There is,
however, a tough-minded empirical streak in Kant that BonJour ignores, yet
should not be minimized:
High towers and metaphysically great men resembling them, round both of which
there is commonly much wind, are not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos of ex-
perience, and the word ‘transcendental’ … does not signify something passing be-
yond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is in-
tended to make cognition possible.11
Kant makes as explicit as possible, in the Introduction to the Critique, the
Transcendental Aesthetic, and elsewhere, that in human experience there is
a fundamental and ineliminable passive component, which he calls sensibility.
To be sure, the epistemic subject, on Kant’s view, contributes the forms of
intuition — space and time — within which sensibility is received; yet this
hardly entails that the subject constructs its own experience, or creates its
own content. This recognition that there is a dimension of our experience that
we confront, rather than create, is about as close as we can get to “the given”
in Kant’s epistemology. One might compare here BonJour’s own insistence
on an “observation requirement” in responding to the traditional “isolation”
—————
9 An anonymous reader for this journal correctly and helpfully points out that BonJour’s
critique does not attribute to Kant the view here expressed by Rorty, and that BonJour’s
account does not rest upon such a view. At the same time, BonJour has recognized
that an adequate epistemology must take into consideration the relationship between
the world and the empirical judgements made about that world, and it remains unclear
on his reading how Kant addresses — or could address — the point. It should also be
noted that this very question has been the source of a long controversy among Kant
scholars, including Jaako Hintikka, Charles Parsons, Manley Thompson, and many
others.
10 “Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism” in Bieri, Horstmann,
and Krüger (eds.), Transcendental Arguments and Science (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979),
p. 79. As Wolfgang Carl points out in his response to Rorty (ibid, p. 106), this seems “to
flatly contradict Kant’s own and well-known position.”
11 Prolegomena, Ak. IV, p. 373 n.; Carus translation, revised by J. Ellington (Indianapo-
lis: Hackett, 1977), p. 113 n..
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objection to pure coherentist theories of justification: namely, that certain
beliefs, as “cognitively spontaneous,” indicate input from an independent
source, or what he calls “extratheoretic input” (SEK: 141ff.). Lacking what
Kant calls “intellectual intuition,” we do not create content; all we can do,
relative to this passive receptivity, is characterize reflectively the forms of
intuition that condition it. But given this component of sensible intuition, we
are responsible for contributing the intellectual apparatus that makes cogni-
tion of objects — experience — possible, a conclusion, as we have seen,
BonJour himself seems to accept. Without that contribution providing justified
universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, the
epistemic subject is simply left with a set of diverse and chaotic perceptions,
not objective experience.12 It is not an ontological claim per se, nor a claim
about the existence of objects;13 it is a claim about the possibility of delineat-
ing the structure of human understanding (and reason). On Kant’s perspec-
tive, it requires reflecting on experience to determine the necessary condi-
tions that make that experience possible. What we thereby discover is a set
of concepts and principles that we are forced to presuppose, a transcendental
analytic that serves as a logic of experience. Such a logic provides only a
modest, minimal structure for experience, but by satisfying the requirements
of universality and necessity, it avoids leaving us with simply a rhapsody of
perceptions without any organization or coherence.
On this view, then, Kant seeks to justify a set of concepts and principles,
qua transcendental logic (specifically transcendental analytic), that are
universal and necessary — hence, a priori — for the possibility of experience.
Just as we might try to justify a straightforward minimal principle of logic, such
as the principle of non-contradiction, by showing its indispensability as a
presupposition for any use of reason, we can see that the burden here, of
justifying a minimal set of a priori rules for possible experience, while still
difficult and fraught with controversy, is both less onerous and more plausible
—————
12 This is the essence of Kant’s critique of Hume. I haven’t seen any need to address
directly BonJour’s claim that Hume and Kant argue largely for the same “moderate
empiricist” conclusions; that they do not should already be sufficiently clear from what
has been said, for Kant’s claims about the necessity involved in synthetic judgements
made a priori can only reduce to analytic phenomenalist claims on BonJour’s adoption
of the dubious “two world” interpretation of Kant’s ontology. BonJour’s view also makes
it much more difficult to see why Kant spent so much time outlining the specific differ-
ences between his view and that of Hume’s, precisely in relation to this issue of
necessity and the a priori; for a good recent discussion of some of the differences
involved, see Longuenesse, B., “Kant et les jugements empirique. Jugements de
perception et jugements d’expérience” Kant Studien 86 (1995), 278-307, esp. pp. 295-
296.
13 In pure mathematics, it should be noted, questions about the existence of mathe-
matical objects are for Kant questions about the constructibility of mathematical
objects. BonJour, in both his discussion of Kant, and more generally throughout In
Defense of Pure Reason, tends not to distinguish logic and mathematics in any
significant sense, nor does he indicate that such a distinction is of fundamental impor-
tance for Kant (and others, e.g. Frege).
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than that which BonJour imposes on Kant’s Critical philosophy. Indeed, it is a
tactic that BonJour himself employs; as he points out, certain positions that
reject a priori justification “can be cogent only if they are themselves justified,
directly or indirectly, in the very way that they are supposed to call into ques-
tion” (123). While adopting this approach on occasion (16; 131; 155; 171),
BonJour never pursues nor develops it in any systematic fashion.
In In Defense of Pure Reason, BonJour argues, largely on the basis of
examples, that certain claims carry with them a degree of epistemic compul-
sion that cannot be accounted for by either a moderate or radical empiricist.
Nor, he suggests, can the traditional rationalist view be accepted, insofar as
its claims of rational insight are both infallible and impervious to empirical
testing or revision (16-17; 144). The inability of empiricism to provide an
adequate explanation of the a priori, BonJour argues, forces it to embrace
skepticism; the obvious failures of traditional rationalism — as seen in the
various cases where infallible rational insight was asserted relative to a claim
later refuted — require significant revision of its commitment to the a priori.
These negative results, supplemented with BonJour’s arguments concerning
our intuitions about necessity, form the basis of his defense of the moderate
rationalist position. What BonJour does not seem to recognize is the remark-
able similarity between his results and Kant’s.
In the First Critique, and elsewhere, Kant describes two models of the
human intellect, only to reject them in favor of his own model. The empirical
model of Locke (and with some — here irrelevant — differences, Hume)
insists that the mind derives its general concepts solely by abstracting them
from experience; as such it cannot sufficiently distinguish an active, sponta-
neous intellect from a solely reactive or passive intellect. Furthermore, it
cannot guarantee the universality and necessity to pure concepts which serve
as conditions of possible experience, concepts Kant argues the empiricists
themselves employ, implicitly, as necessary; pure mathematics gives the
clearest example of the pervasive difficulty that follows the adherence to a
“universal empiricism” (B20). Toward the end of the second-edition Tran-
scendental Deduction, he rejects such a view as a generatio aequivoca, an
attempt to derive pure concepts, which must be independent of experience,
from experience (B167).
The rationalist model, generally represented by Leibniz, is one that
produces its own objects by means of “intellectual intuition,” an “understand-
ing which through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of
intuition, an understanding … through whose representation the objects of the
representation would at the same time exist” (B138-139). On this account,
pure concepts are “subjective dispositions of thought, implanted in us from
the first moment of existence,” which Kant characterizes as “a kind of prefor-
mation system of pure reason,” ordered by our Creator in such a way that the
employment of these dispositions would be “in complete harmony with the
laws of nature in accordance with which experience proceeds” (B167).
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Abstracting from the question of origins, this description is surprisingly close
to the view BonJour attributes to Kant.
Consequently, it is worth noting that Kant points out two insurmountable
problems with such a view. First, there could be no limit set to what “prede-
termined dispositions to future judgements” might be made (B167). That is,
we could not distinguish a set of concepts marked out for pure employment
from concepts whose employment would be illegitimate, so called usurpatory
concepts such as fortune and fate (cf. A84=B117). Second, and the reason
Kant takes as decisive, this preformation model could not account for the
universality and necessity required by the pure concepts of the understand-
ing. “The necessity of the categories, which belongs to their very conception,
would have to be sacrificed” (B168). The categories are synthetic concepts,
employed a priori in judgements, whose only legitimate employment is in
application to intuition. To claim such concepts are implanted subjective
dispositions is to ignore the crucial relation between these concepts and
intuitions; it is through the application of the concepts in judgement that they
can achieve objective universality and necessity. To subscribe to the prefor-
mation model is to claim merely that “I am so constituted that I cannot think
this representation otherwise than as connected” (ibid.). Because the funda-
mental notion behind the Copernican Revolution is that the thinking subject
itself connects its representations and unifies them according to rules through
the transcendental unity of apperception, pre-established harmony would
eliminate the contribution of the thinking subject whereby the objective
application of pure concepts is determined, limited, and justified. It would be
this, Kant argues, that “the skeptic most desires” (ibid.).
As we have seen, then, in contrast to both the empirical and the rationalist
models, Kant specifies a set of synthetic concepts and principles, and argues
that they serve as the a priori conditions for the possibility of experience,
relatively to a passively received manifold of intuition. In this context, it is
crucial to make clear the role justification plays, relative to cognitive claims,
and the entirely distinct issue of truth-determination. For Kant, one deter-
mines the truth or falsity of a given empirical judgement in accordance with
“the nominal definition of truth … the agreement of knowledge with its object”
(A58=B82) While Kant repeats this formulation throughout the Critique of
Pure Reason (A191=B236; A820=B848), it should be noted just how little
Kant says about truth there, in contrast to how much he says about justifying
the conditions for assigning truth-values. Kant is not so much interested in the
truth of a given proposition “p” as he is in establishing the universal and
necessary conditions that allow “p” to be true or false. The content of a given
empirical judgement is contingent upon what is provided in the relevant
sensible manifold; consequently, what we know a priori relative to such
judgements is distinct from whether that judgement is in fact true or false; “a
sufficient and at the same time general criterion [Kennzeichen] of truth cannot
possibly be given” (A59=B83).
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In contrast to this account, BonJour criticizes Kant for not being able to
provide a sufficient justification for any general claim (P) that appears to be
synthetic a priori; worse, “the original proposition P turns out not to be knowl-
edge of any kind and very possibly not even true” (25). Here BonJour utterly
fails to take into consideration the distinction Kant makes between truth and
justification, wherein transcendental analytic cannot yield the truth, but serves
only as a “logic of truth” (A62=B87); on Kant’s analysis, one must sharply
distinguish the truth of a given judgement and what must be presupposed
even to investigate a judgement as true or false. In terms of the logical
analogy that structures the Critique, one would be hesitant to characterize the
principle of non-contradiction as “true” (and certainly not as “false”), nor is it
clear that such a principle would qualify as “knowledge” in any but the most
attenuated sense — as Hilary Putnam has made the point, such truths of
logic “are so basic that the notion of explanation collapses when we try to
‘explain’ why they are true.”14 Similarly, Kant argues that the causal principle
defended in the Second Analogy, qua a principle of the “logic of experience,”
is justified as a synthetic rule employed a priori as a condition of possible
experience; in turn, any specific empirical judgement appealing to that princi-
ple in characterizing an event will remain contingent. To fail to mark this
distinction can, on the one hand, lead to what Kant sees as Hume’s funda-
mental error: “inferring from the contingency of our determination in accor-
dance with the law the contingency of the law itself” (A766=B794). On the
other hand, failing to mark the distinction between what is presupposed in any
investigation into the truth, and the conditions that must be satisfied for a
specific empirical judgement to be true, is to present “the ludicrous spectacle
of one man milking a he-goat and the other holding a sieve underneath”
(A58=B83).
Only on the basis of his (at best) problematic “two world” reading of Kant’s
ontology, and his failure to distinguish sharply the role of the a priori in Kant’s
account of cognition in contrast to the role of truth relative to what is justified
a priori, can BonJour conclude that “a Kantian view … does not constitute a
significant further alternative with respect to the issue of a priori justification”
(25). While I think it clear from the above account that BonJour’s conclusion
here is itself not justified, there are several, relatively minor, points of misin-
terpretation that should at least be noted, in addition to BonJour’s tendency to
conflate Kant’s views of logic and mathematics. First: BonJour seems to
suggest that Kant views his claims about the cognitive capacities of the
epistemic subject under consideration as necessary. It is more plausible to
read Kant as saying in the Critique that if a subject satisfies certain minimal
criteria — the ability to use the first-person pronoun, and to use concepts to
judge passively received spatio-temporal content — then it must necessarily
—————
14 “Analyticity and A Priority,” reprinted in Realism and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), p. 138.
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have certain characteristics. Second: while BonJour argues that certain,
presumably synthetic, principles are ultimately analytic (e.g. the principle of
the transcendental unity of apperception and the causal principle (25 n. 25)),
this is difficult to reconcile with Kant’s repeated insistence that all analysis
presupposes synthesis (B130, A77=B102-103), a point BonJour entirely
ignores.15 Third: BonJour claims, somewhat unclearly, that it is a
quasi-Kantian idea that concepts necessarily falsify the reality that they attempt to
depict, i.e., that any thinking being (or perhaps any being at all like us) will inevita-
bly misrepresent in certain pervasive ways the features of the world that he at-
tempts to represent (152 n. 15).
He adds that he “can find no intelligible rationale of any sort for such a view,”
although he seems not to realize that there is even less plausibility in attrib-
uting this view to Kant, any neo-Kantians, or even any view one might very
generally describe as Kantian; indeed, the distinction BonJour draws on to
make this attribution is not only rejected by Kant, the results BonJour objects
to on the basis of this distinction are, as we have seen, precisely those Kant
spends the most time arguing against: transcendental realism. Fourth: Bon-
Jour asserts that “if Kant had ever faced clearly the problem of the epistemo-
logical status of his own philosophical claims, he might have retreated into a
more traditional rationalism” (25). While one might quibble with the qualifica-
tion of “clearly” here, it is quite obvious from Kant’s work, both published and
unpublished, that he was aware of this issue, and struggled with it throughout
his career. His first critic, J.G. Hamann, registered the complaint in his well-
known, if curious, piece “Metakritik über den Purismum der Vernunft”;16 while
not published until 1800, it is a virtual certainty that Kant was aware of the
thrust of Hamann’s critique. In any case, Kant recognized the problem well
before the writing of the Critique. As he points out in one of his Reflexionen, “I
seek in an understanding, that requires rules, the knowledge [Kenntnis] of
these rules themselves. This is paradox.”17 Yet he came to believe he had
solved this “paradox” — seeking rules of an understanding which must
provide rules to the understanding — as he explains in the Logik Phillipi, a set
of lectures delivered in 1772: “But this paradox disappears when we realize
—————
15 To be sure, Kant does claim that the principle of the transcendental unity of apper-
ception is analytic (although in the first edition of the Critique he claims it is synthetic
(A117n.)); the issue becomes even murkier from the tortuous footnote at B422, where
Kant’s account of apperceptive unity becomes all but impossible to follow. In any case
these confusions, which naturally have spawned a great deal of debate in the literature,
do not permit BonJour’s much more sweeping conclusions, nor do they justify ignoring
Kant’s considered view that synthesis always precedes analysis.
16 Sämtliche Werke (Vienna: Hamann Verlag, 1949-1957), vol. III, pp. 282-289.
17 Reflexion 1592; Ak. XVI, p. 28. The editor of these notes, Erich Adickes, is unsure of
the dating of this note, but places it between 1755 at the earliest, and 1764 at the
latest.
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we are not conscious of them.”18 The point is not simply that we are not
conscious of the rules we employ, but that we can come to recognize, on
reflection, that we must employ them in any investigation. And in other sets of
logic lectures, delivered much later in Kant’s career, he turns to grammar to
make the point: “one speaks without having learned grammar, that is one
speaks according to rules of which one is not conscious”; “one speaks Ger-
man and afterwards brings in the rules of German grammar.”19 In short,
through transcendental reflection on thought and experience, we are able to
isolate, articulate, and then justify the rules that are necessary for this thought
and experience to be possible. To be sure, transcendental reflection takes
place in accordance with rules, and the presupposition of such rules may, at
some level, qualify as dogmatic. But, as Kant points out in a phrase reminis-
cent of Wittgenstein, “We can proceed in no other way in logic. The exercise
of rules isn’t something taught, since I can do nothing other else than by
means of these rules.”20 If Kant’s provocative, albeit deeply controversial,
analogy between general logic and transcendental logic can bear any weight
whatsoever, then there may well be a path open to provide a similar kind of
“justification” for the rules of a logic of experience. But, clearly enough, it is
disingenuous to suggest that Kant did not recognize the issue of meta-
critique.
The point here is not that BonJour fails to be a good Kant scholar, or that
he doesn’t have an historian of philosophy’s grasp of the history of philoso-
phy,21 but that he misreads Kant; on the basis of this misreading, he rejects
the most powerful weapon he has at his disposal for defending his own view,
a view which is ultimately quite similar to Kant’s, and without the kind of
argumentative apparatus Kant — or some kind of systematic approach —
provides. BonJour’s case for moderate rationalism comes to depend largely
on examples, and thus lacks the support required to defend the claims
motivating the need for the a priori to be included in any adequate epistemol-
—————
18 Logik Phillipi, Ak. XXIV.1, p. 316.
19 Logik Pölitz, Ak. XXIV.2, p. 502 (delivered in 1789); Logik Busolt, Ak. XXIV.2, p. 609
(delivered in 1790).
20 Logik Phillipi, Ak. XXIV.1, p. 339. Cf. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations
(New York: MacMillan, 1958), §1: “Die Erklärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende.” Addi-
tionally, Kant might reply that any objection to his approach, to be communicable, must
satisfy the minimal logical conditions he has articulated (cf. A820=B849), a tactic to
which BonJour appeals without, again, systematically developing it.
21 Thus BonJour fails to mention that C.D. Broad’s remark about the failure of justifying
induction as “a scandal to philosophy” (188; 196) is a clear reference — and particularly
ironic in the present context — to Kant’s observation that it is a “scandal to philosophy”
that philosophers (Kant specifies idealists) have had to accept the existence of the
external world on faith, and have been unable to prove it (B xxxix n.); nor does he
mention that the epistemological concerns about the reliability of memory (125ff.) are
precisely those Descartes raises in his discussion of atheism in his Response to the
Sixth set of Objections.
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ogy that BonJour has so compellingly motivated. In short, he seems to
dismiss precisely those arguments that might provide him support where it is
most needed, and this dismissal is grounded in a fundamental misunder-
standing of Kant’s project.
BonJour remarks,
… a combination of a coherence theory of empirical justification with a correspon-
dence theory of truth is most unusual from an historical standpoint, but it is argua-
bly the only hope for avoiding both foundationalism and skepticism while preserv-
ing a dialectically independent basis for defending an account of empirical justifica-
tion (and also a more or less commonsensical conception of reality) (SEK: 158).
It is precisely this combination that BonJour seems unwilling to find in Kant’s
Critical philosophy; yet, as we have already seen, Kant is explicit in his
commitment to a Tarskian (or Aristotelian) characterization of truth. As
Frederick Schmitt has noted, “there are idealists who have been correspon-
dence theorists [about truth]. Immanuel Kant, despite the common attribution
to him of a coherence theory of truth, may be a prominent example.”22 Fur-
thermore, while his account of epistemic justification is notoriously complex,
one can, without too much trouble, find Kant specifically appealing to pre-
cisely the coherentist criterion BonJour defends in The Structure of Empirical
Knowledge and builds upon in In Defense of Pure Reason:
the difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the
representations which are referred to objects (for they are the same in both cases),
but by their connection according to those rules which determine the coherence
[Zusammenhang] of the representations in the concept of an object, and by ascer-
taining whether they can subsist together [beisammen stehen] in experience or
not.23
Finally, as we have seen, Kant’s results relative to synthetic judgements put
forth a priori can only be viewed as analytic, and even vacuous, on a reading
of his texts that is difficult, if not in the end impossible, to sustain. In sum, we
find in Kant’s theoretical philosophy a powerful set of arguments, strategically
going well beyond a dialectical strategy that must ultimately rest on the
intuitive appeal to examples that BonJour uses to supply his positive com-
—————
22 Schmitt, Frederick F. Truth: A Primer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 146;
Schmitt cites as evidence A58[=B82].
23 Prolegomena, Ak. IV. 290. I have not gone into the question here of whether Kant’s
appeal to empirical realism offers “a more or less commonsensical conception of
reality,” in contrast to BonJour’s apparent endorsement of an Aristotelian or Thomistic
ontology (see 183ff.). I will simply note that it is not entirely clear how one can reconcile
Thomistic Realism with what BonJour has argued in SEK in criticizing contemporary
foundationalism and its appeal to “the given.” BonJour admits his views are “highly
tentative and exploratory” (185) and the issue merits more attention than I can give it
here.
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ments in support of the a priori, that includes a commitment to the a priori, a
correspondence theory of truth, and a coherence theory of justification:
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